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Abslrnct-In Ihis p:'p~r W~ im'csligate :lud provide solutions
for security threats in Ihe conlext of hybrid networks consisting
of a cellular base statiun and mobile delices equipped with dual
cellular and all-hoc (llU2.11b) cards. The cellul:lr cOllllcclion is
used for receiving senices (i.l'. Internet acce.',s) from the base
station, and the ad·hoc links arc used III improw lhe llunlity
of the connection. We [)[ovidc dclaill'd descriptions of sewnll
alt:lcks Ihal arbitrarily powerful adversaries. whether out.~iders
or insidcrs, can mounl n~:linsl lI'ell-lJeh:l\"cd memhen; of Ihe
nelwork. WI' inlroduee a secure roulin!': protocol called JANUS.
Ihllt focuses on lhe estahlishmenl of secure roules belween lhe
bnse sllliion lind mobile dc\ices, and lhe secure rouling of lhe
dnln. WI' sholl' thai our prolocol i~ secure ngninsl the allacks
descrihed. \"1' eXl'erimenlall~· :mal)"Z1' Ihe me.'i.~age owrhe:ld
introduced by JANUS :md mcnsufl' its lhroughput gain. We show
thai due to de\ice mobilil~· and lhe exislencl' of concurrenl nows,
JANUS i~ mure eRidenllhan lhe non-secun', on-dcmand rtluling
algorilhm proposcd in UeAN.
1. INTRODUCTION
The generous promisc of Ihe 3G cellular nelworks is to
provide a unilled framework where users can move seamlessly
between cellular nelworks anyWhere in thc world. 3G services
have been provided in Japan by lhe wireless company NIT
DoCoMo for more Ihan IWO years. More recenlly. similar
services slafled being offered in the Uniled Kingdom and Iherc
are indications th'll 3G services will be also offered in US by
lhe end of 2004. 3G services arc designed 10 oITer broadband
cellular access at speeds of 2Mbps (as opposed 10 the 9.6Kbps
rale curremly provided by 2G networks). which allow mobile
multimcdia services 10 hecome possible. The Intemel becomes
thus availablc 10 numerous clienls using laptops or PDAs. via
special network cards. or mobile phones enabled 10 act as
wireless modems.
In spile of ils convenience. Ihe service has lhe drawback
thaI lhe r,lle decreases dramalically as deslin<lliun clienls
move lowards Ihe oUlskiflS uf Ihe base stalion·s coverage
area. A SOIUlioll proposed 10 overcome the problem is 10 use
a network consisling of bolh celhil'lr "nd WLAN devices.
Laptops lucaled in Ihe proximily of the base station can
act as rclayers for le.~s fortunale del·ices. alluwing Ihem to
oblain an increased b'mdwidlh. All devices nrc equipped with
two wireless interfaces. The routing prolocols are aware of
both imerfaces and use them as appropriale 10 improve Ihe
performance of data delivery to clicnt devices. For example.
if deVice A in Figure I, wilh a ccllular rate of O.7Mbps. lIses
devices Band C as relayers, it will achieve a rate of 1.5Mbps.
Note Ihal Ihis raIl' is the bandwidlh of the WOrSl link on Ihe
relayer path.
We refer to such a network consisting of hoth cellular and
\VLAN componenls as a lIyhrid wireless IIefll'ork. We noll' lhat
the new proposed frnmcwurk determines a significant change
in 1111' trusl and communicalion model previously existing in
Ihe nel\vork. In a regular cellular network, the base stalion
requires authenlication of all clienls. Once authenlicated lhe
clienls trust the hase slation and !he traffic nows directly
bel ween the base station and lhe client hust withom lhe help
of any inlermedimy.
In lhe case of the hybrid network, lhe lrusl is no longer
centralized. A client uses several, possibly unknown. devices
as rdayers. In IUrn, lhe rehlycrs have to lrusl each othcr to
funvard lhe aClual data. A clienl can benefil from Ihc usc
of the hybrid network oilly if lite last relayer in the pOllh,
before lhe base slation. has a higher eeUu!,lr rale, and all
lhe relayers behave curreclly. Misbehaving devices fonvarding
data can aCl either in a selfish or malicious manner. The
intentions of a "selfish" device (I J are usually 10 oblain service
withom reciprocaling. In COlllra~t, lhe goal of a malicious
dcvice is 10 disrupt the communication of olher devices in
the nelwork. without regard for ils own resource consumplion.
Such behavior Ciln waste [111' lime and resources of Illulliple
parlicipanls, making them reluctant 10 usc !he service and
choose (he direcl cellular link inslead.
Although the field of designing hybrid wireless nelworks is
new and lhe foclls lV,lS mostly on dala rouling, invcsligating the
security aspecls, idenlifying the threals and propusing possible
solutions is very important. Too many times. lhe fal'l lhal
security and trust were an afterthuught. and nOl considered
from Ihe initial system design. resuhed in systems with serious
nalVs or significanl overhead.
Prior work in security aspecls of hybrid wireless nelworks
focused 1Il0s11y On Ihe selfish node problem [2]. [3J or
anonymity and privacy prcservlng 141. No work. 10 Ihe hesl
of our knowledge, was conum:tcd in addressing the arbitr,lry
m,llicious nodc prohlem in hybrid wireless networks. However,
the effect of allacks coming from nudes that refuse to act
accurding to the prolocol can be devastating in an ad hoc
wireless nelwork. p,lrticularly when allackers arc sLr<Ltegically
placed.
A. Our Foclls
TIle goals of this paper are to idemify the types of iluacks
IhaL malicious hosts can perform in a hybrid wireless nctwurk
and provide efflciellt delecLion and further avoidance of the
malicious parties. as well as an evaluation of the associated
costs. Some 01' the security ,1Spccts thai we will describe were
addressed in the cOlllext of ad hoc networks [51, [6], [7],
[81. [9]. [JO]. However, such schemes focus many times on
llehieving security goals for specific rouLing protocols, or h,lve
significant overhead hecause of the completely decenLralized
Il<lturc of the ad hoc network. We also note thaL such prolocols
offen use a routing seleclion criterion !hat is dilferem from
the onc ,Ippropriate in hyhrid wireless networks (i.e. finding
the highest throughput path), making IlJlsuitllhle their direct
appJic'ltion.
TIle existence of ch,lnncls with different levels of tnlst and
performance. and of a poim of total trust (which is nalural to
the system and 1101 an llnwamlnted assumption) can lead lo
improved schemes. Our approach exploiL~ the hybrid naturc of
the nc:!work 10 minimize the cosl of the security mechanisms,
while makiog very few assumptions ,lbum the hehavior of
participants. More specifically. our conlributions arc;
We idenLify allacks possible in ,I hyhrid wireless nelwork.
We make no assumption abum the attacker, but ralher
assume arbitrary behavior.
• We propose JANUS J • a new routing algoritllm robusllO
malicious allacks. Our solution focuses on the protecLion
of the routing mechanism itself. as well as the routing
of data, and exploits the hybrid lrust model. Whcn
appropriale. we take adv,lntage of Ihe low-bandwidth
direcL communieation link thal each host has with the
base station to transmit critical infonnalion ilnd idcntify
problematic links.
We provide a security ,m,llysis of the proposed scheme.
We experiment<llly compare our prolocol with UCAN, in
!erms of the cellular and ad-hoc lrafflc generatcd. Our
slmulalions show thal JANUS generales up to 4 times
less cellular traffic and up to 60% less ad-hoc traffic than
UCI\N. in order to maintain up to 30 concurrent Aows
for up 10 500 mobile hosts. Moreover, Lhc throughput
improvement of JANUS is on average more than twice
the lhroughput achieved by UCAN.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
provide an overview of related work in Section II. \Ve define
the nelwork and security models we assume in Seetion Ill.
Ihnn" lhe god who W<LS guardian "r pl>nab and palron of beginnings alllt
ending, had hi. heall alway5 5hown 1"11h 1\\'0 r"r~,;: "n~ in Ihe rronl and one
"llh~ bac·k. A. Janll.,. aillhe h051S in Ihe nell'urk )ml'~ 11.\''' "rat"Cs··. a ccllutar
communicalion link and an H02_llb commlmicalion tink.
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Our mllllSI algorilhm is presented in Seelion IV and its
security is analyzed in Section V. We present the experimental
comparison of JANUS and UCAN in Sectioo VI. Finally.
conclusions and future work are presented in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Although new. the hybrid wireless network field 11<ls been
quitc acLive, particularly in designing efficient routing mech-
anisms. In this section we overview previous research con-
ducted in (wo areas related with our work: milling and
addressing security concerns.
It ROII/illg ill Hybrid Wirefe.I·.\· Networks
UCAN [21 provides two routing algorithms thal allow cliem
hosls 10 find husts thaL are willing to forward lheir traffic.
The first algorithm greedily propagates !he rOllling reljuest
10 a single neighhor. based on !he besl rale advertised by
its neighbors. The sccond algorithm is based on a restriclcd
depth flooding 10 fiod the besl proxy host. However. since both
algorilhms ignore the finite eapacilies of the ad-hoc links. they
du nUl find Ihe highest throughput palh.
Fujiwara, lida and W"tanahe [II] provide ,I unieast routing
algoriLhm thai allows mobile hosts to find an alternate path to
lhe base stalion. when the cellular conneclion fails. The focus
of the work is on reeslablishing cunneetivity lo the base station
via short p<lths, in response to emergcncy situations where
direCl conneelions Lo the base station m,ly beeome sparse. This
is a differenL goal from JANUS. which allempts to optimize
throughpul under norm,11 conditions, where all hosts have a
direct eonneClion to the base stmion via lhc cellular interface.
H. SeCliriry in Hyhrid Wireless Networks
Securing hybrid wireless networks is an area that was nUl
intensively explored to d'ltC. By using a mechanism hased
on incentives, UCI\N [2] provides only fragile protection
againsl selfish nodes. UCAN's focus is on preventing indi-
vidual hosts from deleting legilimate hosts or adding non-
authorized hosls to the set of relayers that receive credit for
forwarding data. The mechanism is entirely defenseless when
faccd wilh collusion. The work in [3] provides incemives for
collaboration in a nelwork where mobile hosls arc covered hy
sevcral access points. Thc main assumption of the paper is thai
the hosts arc selfish, Iherefore only trying to gain undeserved
advanlages. Moreover. Lhe solulion provided does not describe
the underlying roming algorithm, but only assumes that there
is one and that it is secure. Finally, the work in ]4] focuses
on preserving the anonymity and privacy of mobile hosts ill a
network covered by several access points.
The problcm of defining compelling methods to make
nodes pilrticipate in forwarding dala was also <lddressed in
the conlext of traditional ael hoc wireless networks [J] and
resulled in designing prolocols that provide fair access to the
mediulll. Abo the peer-Io-peer (P2P) community conducted
research for a similar prohlem, mOSl of the solUlions focusing
on designing incentive mechanisms [12], [13]. [14]. [15]10
motivale peers to participate in providing storage resoufl:es or
in data fnrwarding.
In the conlext of ad hoc wireless network, research was con-
ductcd mainly on securing roUling prolOcols and designing key
mal1agement prolncols. Problems lhat were addressed include
traditional i1Uacks such as impersonation and replay relying on
secure association. symmetric-key b'lsed cryptographic mech-
anisms, or digital signamres [6]. [7J, (X]. More sophisticated
attacks such as wormhole [161, nood-rushing 1171, or arbiLr<lry
Byzantine behavior [51 were also considered. We note that
in most of the cases_ the work focused on securing specific
prolocols, such as DSDV [IS], DSR [19] or AODV 120].
"fhe cellul<lr network protocols <lnd standilrds also include a
security component. The core services provided by any of lhe
cellular eommunicalion protocols (such as GSM [21], GPRS
[22] or UMTS ['2.3]) .Ire amhelllicalion of subscribers (c1ienls).
providing subscriber identity confidentially, and confidenliality
and integrity of holh data communication and radio signaling.
Clients <Ire authcnticaled using <I challenge-response protocol,
based on a key and using algorithms stored on the Subscriher
Identity Module (SIM) smart card. oblained when Lhe client
subscribes to the service.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In lhis seclion we presenl the mudel we assume for Lhis
paper. We first describe the network model, and then show
wh<ll sel of aclions defines an <ldversarial behavior.
A. Ne/work Model
The nelwork consists of a cellular base station (BS) amI
several mobile hosts (i1Hs). All the mobile hosts are inside the
cellular eoverilge range of the base sliltion, and each host has
an accuunt estahlished with BS.
The base station has access tu the wired Interne!. and
the mnbile hosts duwnload infomlation via Lheir cellular
conneclion. Therefore, mnst of the traffic is issued by Lhe
base staLion. In addition, mobile hosts can cOllllllunic,](e
with other hosls ill mnge. usin~ 802.llb wireless cilrds.
We assume hi-direclion<ll communication on all the 802.1 I b
links in the network. This is also required by most wireless
MAC prolocols. includin~ 802.11, to operate correclly. The
following table provides the tennino[ogy used in this paper.
B. Seclfril)' Assumptions
The b"se stalion is trustcd hy each host. The hase sIal ion au-
thenticates every client and eSlilhlishcs a secure i1ulhelllicated
channel with Lhe clienl. I\s shuwn in Section II-B mOSI of lhe
cellular communlcalion prolocols provide such a service. We
note that the cellular COlllmunicalion links can be disrupled by
allilcks al the physical layer. Such allacks arc out of the scope
of this paper and arc not considered.
Hosls thm can nOl be aUlhenticaled hy lhe base stiltion
do noL participate in the protocol and are not lrusted. Any
inlennediaLe host on Ihc pmh belwcen Ihc hase st<llion and
lhe destination client can he amhemic'lIcd. hut may exhibiL
arbiLrary (Byzantine) hehavior, 1\tl<lckers will lry to inflict as
milch harm as possible un tlie other hosts in [he nelwork.
withoUi considermion for their own resources. We <lssume that
an inlermediate hosl can exhihit such bell'lvior either <llone or
in collusion with other hosts.
We focus on providing .1 secure routing prmoco!. which
specifically addresses tme,lts 10 the network layer in the
ISOIOSI model. We do not addrcss [!llacks against lower layers
in Ihe ISOIOSI model. We note thaI the physical layer Ciln also
he disrupled hy jamming, and MAC prolocols such a~ S02.1 I
c.m he disrupled by aBack,<; lhal deny access 10 clients and
allow a pOlenlial misbehaving node to take over the ch,mncl
[J], [25]. We do nOl address such allacks in this work.
A puhlic-key infrasLructure is required for nperalions such
as signature generalion ,lOU verification. imd sllared key es-
lablishment. 1llis infrastructure can be based on certificales.
where the base stillion plays lhe role of Certificale Authority
(CA), and each host knows the base stilliOll'S public key.
IV. OUR SOLUTION
In this scction we presenl JANUS. Ollr rouling algorithm,
thm identifies links over which aUilckers operate. The algo-
rithm illso provides information ahoUlthe detected link 10 the
parties affecled, allowing them to locally Iilke lhe necessary
countermeasures. We first provide it high-level description of
,m un-secure routing algorithm lhat uses as routing criterion
the highest lhroughpllllo the hase slalion. We then idenlify thc
Iype of illlacks Lhat call be moumed in Ihe different philses of
the protocol <lnd describe in details our security mechanisms.
A. AfgoriflllJ1 Ol'en';cil'
The core meellilnisrll of our routing algorithm is 10 selecl
for each host. a path providing the highesttmuughpUi from lhe
base station. This is achieved hy each host periodically probing
il~ neighbors for their currenttmoughpul ilnd selecting the one
providing the highest villlle. Such a hosl is c<llled Ihe p"relll.
1l1e period of the neighbor probing is called rcfrcsh Ttlte. The
overall information maintained by the hosls can be viewed
as a tree encoding Ihe best throughput frolll the base station
lo <lny hus!. Note that in rcality. this is .111 ilpproximation
of the besl throughput sincc hosls move. lhus changing lhe
Ihroughput. A small period refresh of the tree will provide a
good approximation. but mighl incur higher cost. We call lhis
tree the rollling free.
uDefinition
forwanl link cellular link from BS to a MH
reverse link cellular link from a MH to BS
ad-hoc link 802.llb link beLween two MHs
bandwidth capacity of .my wireless link
throughpUl capacity of a path from BS to all 1m
~ Name
We ,lssumc that each mobile hosL IS eqllIpped wHh a GPS
receiver thm provides reliable positioning. Tn <lddition, we as-
sume Ihal the base slation and the mobile hosls have synchro-
nized clocks. GPS already provides a clock synchronization
method, with im error of up lo 340 ns [24]. Allem"'ivcly. we
could use a similar synchroni7iltion mechanism hetween Ihc
base slatlon and Ihe mobile hosts.
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r-lg. I. R~IC lnlhtcr Allaek ilhL'll1l1ion. The thicker li",:s r~pr~""nt relltlln,
links ~nd Illc pl~in lines ad-llllC links. The da5hcd line "'present.' an inc~is(cn1
link. <;:llkd a llmncl. The numher.; lhal label Ihe Ilnes represent Iheir u,'uibbk
handwidlh in Mbp.l. A link labeled wilh two nlll11b1:rs. one uf lbern helwoxn
parentheses. is a maliciously o,'er"slimmcd link_ The Ii "'1 llurnh.e, rrprCSCnlS
Ihe ;,d\'cniscd link barulwidlh and the second one represents Ihe correCI value.
In order [0 compute its current Ihroughpllt. .1 host may need
(0 (nlverse O(n) hosts up to the base slation, where Il is the IOlal
number of hosts. For small n. this is not a problem. hUl for
dense. metropolitan ,lrcas, the number of messages produced
C,1II aggravate congeslion. To m<lintain the rOllling tree with
O(logn) number of messages per update oreration. we assume
lhal a supporting IOp%KY free [26J is used. We will describe
the operations supported and properlies of a topology tree in
more detail, in Section IV-C
We nole lhat the routing and topology tree construelion rep·
resents the proactive pari of the protocol. Due to host mobility.
the lrces require permanent maintenance. The protocol has
also a reactive part, inilia!ed when a host needs 10 download
infonnation. The e1ient hosl then contacls its parent in lhe
routing lree, thai in turn will conlaet its parent and so on,
until Ihe mess<lge re<lches Ihe base stalion. This phase. e<llled
pa/" reservatioll, requires each host COlll<lcted 10 locally verify
the ,Ivailability of the resources requesled by the client. Such
a hosl then appends iL~ identity 10 the message received from
ilS child and forwards it 10 ils parent. AI Ihe complelion of
this phase, the base slation knows Ihe client bost name, the
information requested by it, the path to that client, and the
bandwidth available on Ihal path. Hlhen sends the informalion
requested along !he palh, <II Ihe available rate. The protocol
can be roughly broken inlo thc following cornponents.
construcling the rOUling lree
• constructing the topology trce
• periodically refreshing the routing tree and topology tree
• perfunning thc path reservation protocol
• forwarding the data
8. Semr;ry GOllfs
In this section we present details of several types of anacks
thaI org:mized malicious hosts can perform against well be-
haved hosts.
ll) IlI/persolla/io/l: A host can tl)' to impersonate other
hosts in order to oblain chearer services or pl<lCC blame for
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malicious actions on other hosts. Also a node ran Iry 10
impcrsonale the base st,ltion to create havoc in Ihe network.
h) R(I{e IlIjfm;oll: A host can advertisc a larger Ihrough-
put than il can provide. This can be done by inflating the
bandwidth of its forward link or the bandwidth of ils ad-hoc
links. A host 11 thm lies about its throughput will be able tn
negatively atreci not only adjaeem 11O.~IS. but also hosts Ihat
have 11 <IS an anrestor in the routing tree.
fur example. ·111 Figure I. hosl A should choose B as
parent. ~ince it provides the I<lrgestthrouglJpUlto BS, 1.5Mbp~ .
However, if host D advertises ,1 forward link bandwidth of
1.9Mbps instead of I.IMbps. or 1.7Mbps inslead of J.1Mbps
for Ihe bandwidth of its ad-hoc link to C. A will choose
D as parent inslc<ld. effeclively achieving only a I.JMbps
throughput. This anack will negatively affect hOSI E as well,
since A is its p<lrcnl.
c) 1illlnefing: Two lion-adjacent hosts can collude by
adverlising ,Ill excellent bandwidth for (he link between lhem.
1l1eir cOTllrmmication can be encrypted and scm through an
ad hoc established path of mobile hosts. ur simply through
the base st'llion. This <I!lack can be viewed <IS <I parlicular
c<lse of Ihe rate infl,nion all<lck. bllt also a~ ,m insmnce of a
\Yormllofe [161 aLt<lck.
For example. in Figure I. host D could collude with hosl G.
and advel1ise a high rate fur Ihe link belween D ,md G. Their
agrccmem could be perfected eilher tllroUgh F or through BS.
Nole that F does l10t rleed to cooperate. since lhe agreement
call be encrypted.
d) Denia/ ojSen'ice: Since each host has a direct cellular
conneclion with the base s!alion. any number of malicious
colluding devices cannot prevenl other hosts from receiving
cellular service. Malicious hosts could however generate arbi-
trary amounts of useless traffic in Ihe network. by generating
requests for dala lhat Ihcy do not inlend to usc, wa.~ling
network rcsources.
e) Par" Scm/llhl;II~: The last phase of JANUS requires
the base station to know the entirc roUling tree path between
a client host and (he base station. Since that knowledge is
obtained by requiring intermedi<lte hosts on Ihat palh 10 append
(heir names to a message, malicious intennediate hosts can not
only add and remove hosts from lhal path. but also change the
ordcr of hosts. This attack will cause packets 10 be los!, with
the additional problem of ,Illowing the allacker to frame other
hosls. In addition. by Illanipulating the path. a host can make
Sllre he is selected 011 a particular path and later Oil usc that
10 his advantage.
/) Black Hofe: A malit:ious relayer can sclertivcly drop
packels received. instead of forwarding them IOwards their
intended Llcstination. This <lllack can potentially drop the
IhroughpUl of a host (0 zero.
C Secure Tree COllstruction lllld MlI;IITellllllCe
Gur routing algorithm distriblllively builds a spanning !ree,
called IVllting Iree. lo provide hosts with the highes( through-
put from Ihe base st<ltion. The mobility and intermittent
conncrtivity of Ihe hosls impose adaptive requirements on
any roUling algorithm. In this section we define the operations
used for maintaining Ihe routing tree and discuss their secure
implememation.
The set of mainLemlllce operations consists of Cut. Link,
l1incost and Update. Cut spliLs a lree into IWo subtrees
by removing all edge belween two vertices. Link joins lwu
subtrees by adding an edge between IWO vertices. each in ,.
differenL suhtree. l1incos"t rellims the COSI of the minimum
cost edge nn the palh from n vertex to Lhe rool of lhe lree.
which in our ca~e is lhe bnse staLion. Finally, Update adds
or removes II! from the weighl of each edge on lhe palh
from a vertex 10 the roO! of lhe tree. A simple. low overhead
implementaLion of these operations with a o(n) time. where
n is the number of vertices, or mobile hosls. per update
operation may be preferahle when the size of the network is
small. In Ihis sectiun. we dISCUSS how we can implemenl the
above operntions using topology lrees. with ,I o(logn) time
per operation.
Topology trees are an instance of link-cut trees. which
sUppOri a superset of the ahove four operations for mainlaining
rooted trees in o(log n) time per updale operution. The size of
the topology tree is o(n) and its heigh I o(n). We assume that
Ihe base stalion stores and mainlains Ihe topology tree. Since
cellular base stations have 10 keep information for every host
that is logged in their cell. storing Ihe topology (ree does not
impose an unrealistic overhead. Effectively. the hase station
acts as an orude thai answers queries and update requests from
the hosts. The usc of lopulogy trees guaranlees lh"t such an
oracle is efficient, but in principle any implementation of the
four operations can serve as oracle. We nOle lh,lI even Ihough
Lhe base stalion is a single point of failure. the inherenL loss
of Ihe lopology Iree due 10 lhe base slation·s..failure is noL all
additional problem. This is because the Lopology tree is used
to provide hOSIS with easy 10 maintain, high throughput paths
from Ihe base slation.
In Ihe following, we describe in more detail each of lhe
operations. in the context of Lhe base s(ation aCling as an
oracle, and discuss Lheir secure deployment for JANUS.
em: The cut(v) operation splits a rouLing Lree by remov-
ing the edge between host v and ils parent. Whenever a
host needs to change the p<lrCnL eilher d\le to Lhe parent's
failure or tlle discovery of a betler placed neighbor. the
host needs to update the routing tree by firsl CUlling
the edge to its p<lrent. For lhis, the host conlacts the
hase staLion wilh <I message encrypted using the key
shared with the base station. The purpose of encryption
is to prevent other hosls from eOtling edges arbitrarily
in the rouLing tree. Thc cu"t operalion is nOI otherwise a
hazardO\ls operalion from a securiLy standpoinL, since a
host has the liherty of choosing any parent.
• MillcOSl: The mincost(v) operation relllrns the minimum
cost of an edge in the roUling tree, 011 lhe path between
host v and Lhe base station. Whenever a mobile host
needs to choose a parenl in Ihe routing tree. it queries
its ad-hoc neighbors. Since the oracle is assumed 10
reside in the hase staLion, we have two choices for the
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deploymem of mincost. In lhe firsl solUilon. whenever
a host needs to find a new parenl il contacts the b<lse
sIal ion. providing Ihe list of neighbors and the throughput
oj' the correspomling edges. The base stalion relrieves Lhe
mincost of each neighbor 'Illd returns the identity of Lhe
onc providing the clienl hosl with the highestthroughpllL.
In lhe second solUlion. Lhe b<tse st<tlion periodically sends
e,leh hust a signed and Lirneslamped certificate containing
lhe hos'-s mincost vallie. \Vhenever a hosl needs a new
parent, it collects the certificates of all its neighhors.
checks Lheir validiLy and freshness and makes its own
local decision.
Link: The link(u, v. "") operation merges the fOUling Iree
rooted aL hOSl u wilh the routing Iree of host v. by making
v lhe parent of u. The bandwidth of Ihe added edge is
\.I. This operaLion is the fCverse of cut, and iL is used by
a host 10 complcle the procedure of changing the parent.
We can now summarize the p<trent change operation to
be ,I succession of cut, mincost and link opera(ions.
There are two Lypes of edges in Lhe rouling model,
cellular furward edges and symmetric ad-hoc edges. The
b,mdwidth evalualion of forward links c<tn he done by the
base Sl<ltion. and of ad-hoc edges by the corresponding
mobile end-points. Existing Lools such as nellimer (27]
or pathrale [28], can be used 10 measure lhe bandwidlh
of a single link.
'IllCre are however securiLy issues IhaL need Lo be ad-
dressed. Malicious hosts C,1Il invent links Lhat do not
exist or provide overestimaLes of the bandwidlh of ex-
isting links. To prevenL lhis, Ihe b,mdwidlh evaluation
of forward links c<ln be secored hy lhe base station in
lhe following way. For every probe packet acLively senl
hy tlle hase stalion, the mubile endpoim of the link has
to reply with the arrival Lime ilnd a message digest of
the packet. The message digest ensures Lhe correct and
complete receipL of lhe probe. The arrival time is Ilsed
10 compute Lhe distance between the base stiltion and
the mobile hOSI, and thus evaluate Lhe forward link's
bandwidLll. This procedure is secure, since the acLive
endpoim of the forward link is the base staLion, that
is trusted. The mobile host can only delay the packets,
effectively decrell,\'ill~ the bandwidth of the link. This is
not a prohlem, since we oilly care <IboO! overestimations.
The secure cvalumion of the ad-hoc links is more difficult,
since boLlt endpoints can be malicious and colluding. If
lhe base stalion relics only on the bandwidth evaluated
and provided by the TemOle mobile hosls, there is no way
of deciding if Lhe infonnation is correct. To solve this
issue. we use the verifiable posilion information [29J.
that mobile hosls can provide, see Sectioo III-A. For
this, Ule endpoims of an ad-hoc link first locally evaluate
the bandwidLh of the link, in a way similar to the base
statioll evaillalion of fonvaru links. Then, along with Lhe
link parameters, each of Lhe endpoill! hosls sends to lhe
base stmion its posiLion. Using a lechnique similar 10 Sat-
Range [291. Lhe hase staLion verifies Ihe accuracy of Lhe
D. Secure Pm" Rcscn-mioll
Fig_ 2. S~cnre Pmh Reservation pcrr"'lIl~d by hosl A. A fi rSI asks Ihe
b"-I~ .'lalion for a si£ned .enifi l'at~. aUowinJ: A 10 res,',,'e resourl'eS wilh
a1hcr bmls. <";]lIed rdayers. The aClual re~en'ati"n i, done when .·1 sends all
"IDDF lIl~s,aJ:~ 10 its paren!. Ihal in lum will fon"ard II 10 its p:uenl. and
so on. unlil il rcaches th~ rOOI of Ihe roulin!!: lr~e. RH_
The reactive pnn of JANUS lakes place when a mobile host.
A. needs 10 downloau informaLion from Ihe Internet, vill the
base stmion. In such a sitll'lIion. ,Ill the intermediatc hosts
between A's parent and (he base station neeu to be nOLified of
INIT, IdA, EK~", (IN IT. IdA, ssnA, rateA' thrA, fn).
TIle values cont<lineu in the packet nrc the ones described in
line 9, inSlantiated for hos! A. The thresholu value thrA is
the smallesl throughpul that A considers useful, ami must be
therefore larger than A's fonvard link bandwidth. When Ihe
base slation receives an IN IT message (line 50), i! responus
by senuing A a signed message SGN. EK"" (IdA, ssnA, rateA).
When Areceives Ihc message (line 12), :t~'erifies the signaLure
and COlllacts its parent. with a message of type ADDF with the
following structure
the decision. The imermediaries are given the oppOrLUnily to
refuse panicip<1lion or to confirm their available resources. We
call Ihis process the pmh resen-'ar;oll phase. The Ihroughpm
value maintaineu by A. rateA. can be inaccurate. due to large
v<llues of the refresh rate of the topology tree and high network
mobility. During the palh rescrv,l!ion phase. intennediatc hosts
have the ,lbility Lo adjusL the innccurate throughput values of
their rouling tree euges.
The path reservation phase has Ihe additional purpose of
proviuing the base station with the identities of all the inter-
meui<lle hosts to A. A simple way to achieve this woull.1 be
10 require each nOLified hosl 10 conlaet the hase station on
(he reverse cellular link and reveal its iuentily. We avoid this
solution, uue to (he potentially large numher of such contacts
on a low banuwiuth link.
Figure 2 illustrates our sO[U1ion, and I\fgorilhms I and 2
present Ihe pseudocode using an Orca [301 like synlax. Orca
is a parallel programming language for distribmed systems.
Lh<lt provides elegant constructions for expressing reactive
behavior, such as guan1.~·. Operations can consist of one or
more guarus with symax
guard expression do statementSeq ad 2.
ADDF, IdA. ssnA. E~,. (ADDF, IdA. ssnA. rateA), HMACK,(IdA).
When a host N receives an ADDF message (line 20),
ADDF. IdA. ssnA. HMAC." EK", (ADDF. IdA. ssnA. rateA). Id l ., ,<I.' .
.... Idk, where IdA. Id l... Idk are the iuentitics of all Lhe
intermediale hosls from A to Nand HMACk is ,1II onion HMAC
of all these hosts as reported by Idk, it first checks the
signature of BS (line 22). N then checks Ihat the last host in
the path ret:civcu in the ADDF message. Idk, is its neighbor
Host A initiates the palh reserva(ion phase wiLh operation
pa'thReserve. by cOlltacling the base slation through its
reverse link. (Jines 9-1 I), with a message of Lype HIIT,
containing A's iuemity, a session identifier ssnA, rateA, a
Lhreshold value, and an iuentifier of the information needed
from the base station, tn, <Ill encrypted wilh the secrcL session
key sh<lreu by A wilh the base station. The message strucLure
is the following
:C1<p.-C5Sion is ~ booleilll ~xprc~,ion and :;l;a~el:lentSeq i, a sequence or
Simemcnls, The opcr~lion conlnini,,£ £u"HI, blocks llnlil one or 1IIme guards
arc lru~, 'Il,en one of lhose guards is rdndomly chosen and ils >Iatemenls arc
e.\eculed alomically,
"--------•
L IN'T. A. '~'. ,h.
pOSll101i reported by the endpoints. If the pmitions are
accurale. the b,lse slaLion evaluates the bamJwiuLh of the
au-hoc link. bnsed on dislanee. and perfonns Inc link
operation using the minimum beLween the eV<1luateu value
,1IlU Inc value reported by Ihe enupoims.
Update: The update(v. '11") operation adds Ihe value \.1 10
lhe banuwidth of all the links on the routing tree path
from host v 10 the base s(aLion. This operalion is used
whenever n hosl needs to reserve or release a palh of
rei ayers used for downloading inform<tlion from the base
st,uion.
Using the update operation, a m,llieiollS host could try
to add arbitrary values ({) the bandwidlh of the links of its
ancestors in the routing tree. However, this openl!ion can
he easily supervised by the base Slat ion. in the following
way. When a host needs 10 download information, the
base station firsL relrieves the minimum bandwidth of
a link on the path from lhe host 10 the hase station,
see Section IV-D. The BS then performs the update
operalion with the negaLive of thai minimum bandwidth
value as '101, in order to resen'e resources along th,u path.
When a download is completed, the base stmion performs
an updal;e oper,llion using the flow's transmission rate.
as the posilive '101 value. in oruer (() release resources
on the paLh from the client host to the base sIal ion.
The operation can therefore prouuec no harm, since the
base station uecides the 1ft' value of each update(v.lJ)
operation. Moreovcr. an updal;e with a positive w- value
can only be performeu after an update wilh it negative
w value, and the <lbsolutc w- values neeu to coinciue.
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Algorithm I The generie host's view of lhe path resePlation
and dma forwarding phases. We use packet[iJ to extract the




~. Id, SSn , intoger:
5. ra'to, throld , real:
6. K.~: ~tring,#key shar"d "ith BS
7. ~b' string; #8S'9 public key
8, OJ>l:rolion pathR..~ .. rveO
'J. p:= ne" String(IIlIT, Id, S5n + +.rate. 'throld. In);
10. packet ,= nel' Packot(IllIT. EK,,,, (p))'
I I. sendTOHS(packot):
12. ~uord inQ.tirst.type = SGll dn
13. verifY(~b' sgn:= inC,first[2)):
I~. p ,= ne" String(ADDF. Id, ssn. sgn, hmac(K"hT. Id)):





20. guard inO.first.type = ADDF (]o
21. pOlcket := inC.first:
22. sgn:= wriry(K::;:b.pOlcket[4]):
23. ir correcl(sgn. packet) - fals .. tllen
2.1. p ,= nell String(ERR, Id. Idk}:
25. .~endT"lIS(""" Packot(ERR. p)):
26. fi
27. sIOre(pOlcket):
2M. ir cnp(pnrent) < sgn[3]lhclI
29. p:= nc" String(LOlI", Id, parent. t""p(paront}):
~O. sendTollS(no\l Packet(LOIJ. p):
3L l,.'1lard inQ.first.type = SGll dn




36. packet[S] := hmac(K=hr. pOlcket!S], Id);
37. sondToPar(pOlcket):
J8. od
~9. gllnrd inQ.first.type = FLOll" do
40. packet := ina, Erst;
41. il"packet[2] = ld then
,],2. ir checkllmac(packet) = true lhen
4). h := Ilmac(K,hr. AGK, ld. packot[3]'1 1. packet['!])'
·14. sendToBS(ne"Packot(ACK, Id.h»),
45. el~e sendTnHn,t(ne:<l(packotI2J). packet)'
46. fi
~7. end
,md child in the spanning lree (line 23) . If lhe check f'lib. the
host contacts the base station with iln ERR message cOllt<lining
its identity and the identity of Idk . Otherwise, if a message
from A \Vas never received by N, N stores a record for A (line
27). with the following format
where HMACk is the HMAC received.
Ifh()(h checks succeed. Nchecks lhe capacily of its own link
to its parent. cap(N. P), (line 28). If cap(N. P) < rate!. it con~
t<lcts as. wilh a message of type LOW, containing its identity.
lhe identity of its parent, and the value cap(N. P) (lines 29-30).
The base station (lines 57·61) compares cap{N,P) with thrA.
If it is smaller, it contacts Athat will look for iln ahernate palh,
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Algorilhm 2 The base slOIlion's view of the palh reservalion
and doll" forv.mding phases.
4S.0bjcct i"'plc",on'tiltion BaseSlalion:
49. OperalirlD main()
50. guard inC.firsl.l)'pe - WIT do
51- intld:= inO.first[2]:
52. packet :~--' decQ'pl(inQ.lirstI3]. K,_):
53. 5Iore(packet):
54. pack",'t := siJ:n(Id. pack"tI2!. packet[3). K~lV)'
55. sendToH""I(ld. nC" Packet(SGII. pack"t}}:
56. od
57. I:uard i"Q.fir:it.type = LOll (]o
5H. packet:= inO.Iirst:
59. p ,= siJ:nNewKate(packe't):
60. scndTnHost(packol;[2). ne" Packel(SGII. p»),
6L lId
62. guard inC.first.type ----, AODF do
63. packet:= inQ,first:
6·1. ir chcckllmnc(packet) = lTUC Ihen
65, dest := packet!packcl.size],
(,f,. Id:= packet[2]: ilpOlcket[2] is client
67. String inIc:_ E."" (.-ctTie,'c(lnl_, }):
r,M. b~e:lk(inln.n}: ,"
69. r"ri'-Ilondo
70. h :_ IIIIJnC{K:~J'nolo'. Id. i. infoli)):
11, p:= 'leo String(Ft.Oll". Id.i.infnJiJ, hl:






or choose a different thrcshold value. If lhe value is larger than
the threshold. it replaces rateA with cap(N,P).1L then relurn.~
to N the SGN me.~sage SGN. EIlS(IdA. ssnA. cap(N. P)}. When N
receives the SGN message (line 31), it replaces the sign,lture
in the ADDF packct with the one receivcd in the SGN message
(line 32). N then appends ils identifier 10 the packet (line 35),
computes a new HMAC im:urpuraling the received HMACk and
its identity and key shared with the base slat ion (line 36) and
sends the new ADDF message lu iL~ parent (line 37). The sent
message h,IS the following fonn,lt
The path reservation process ends when the base station
receives the ADDF message initiated by A (line 62). In the
following section we describe the data forwarding phase.
ro. Dara FOlw{/rdillg lIlld Wack /late Dern'rioll
When the base st,llion receives all ADDF message (line 62),
BS checks the validity of the HMAC. against the idemities
alld shared keys with the hosts in the path received (line
64). If the I-lMAC is valid. the b,lse station retrieves the
infnrmation requesled in lhe INIT message and encrypts il
wilh the symmetric key shared by as with A (line 67). The
encf)'pled information is hroken inlo packets (line 68) and
forw,lrded (() the host whose idemifier is lhe hIS! in the ADDF
fig. 3. Path sernmbkr atlack performed by host F against host A. The ADDF
mC5sage reeeh'ell b)' F nlntain, the identIties of A... .E. bUl lh~ ADDF mess~gc
scm by FlO G has a scr.lInhl~d li.,t of idcntitic:s. A. D. B. E. F,
V. ANALYSIS
In this section we present the defenses provided by JANUS
against the aLlacks described in Scction IV-B.
0 0 0 0 0 • 0
0 0 0 0 0 • 0
I





tree path hetween BS and A. Second, in [5], the probes arc
selected hy the originator of the traffic. by sending messages
on the multihop ad-hoc path from i!self to each probe. The
acknowledgments scm by each probe, arc also sent on the
multihop ad-hoc path hetween the probc and the originator.
In contrasl, JANUS profits from the dual n<lture of hybrid
networks, and transferx all the communication with the probes
on the secure cellular Jinks. lhus greatly reducing thc traffic.
By making tllis dislinction of the links in the hybrid ncLwork
mudeL we can view lhe ad-hoc links as the dala path ...nd Lhe
cellular links as the control path.
A. impersonarioll
AlIlhe communication between the base station and mobile
hosts is aUlhenticated using pairwise sccret keys. Moreover,
when the authenlicity of packets needs to be verified by
tbird party hosls. we use digital signatures, crealed with Lhe
base station's privme key. Note Ihat each host knows lhe
b..se station's public key. (Sectioo III-B). The usc of digital
signatures is reslricted due 10 their high computation cos\.
Wc note however that mobile hosts only perfoml signature
verirication. which is much faster than signature genermion,
performed only by tbe base slat ion.
R. Rare illjiarioll alld TUlfnelillS
Rale inflalion occurs when a host advertises a maliciollsly
increased bandwidth valuc on its forward link or one of
its adjacenl ad·hoc links. Tuoneling occurs when two lIon-
,ldjacent colluding hosts create a path between them. either
tllfough the base stalion or mhcr mobile hosts, <lnd then
advertise each other as neighbors. Since the base station
where Idp is the identity of the probe, and PKT1 and PID
represent the packet acknowledged and its idenLifier. TIle
selection of the probes models a binary search of the faully
link. TIle binary search views the path between tlte b<lsc stiltion
,md the client A as an interval whose endpoints are BS and
A. i\n interval whose right endpoint does nO! acknowledge a
packet but whose left endpoint docs, is said Lo be a faulty
inlerval. When a faully inlerval is detected. initially the 5S 10
A interval, the interval is divided by selecting ..s a new probe,
the host lhat is e{luidistant, in number of hops, to the en points
of the interval. The faulty interval division process continues
until the faulLy imerval is a link.
JANUS eliminales sever,,1 difficulLies of [5]. FirSl, as a side
effect of the path reserv"tion phase, tbe sender, 5S, knows the
identities of all the hosls on its path 10 A. Unlike [5], where
lhe discovery of the intermediaries is broadcast-based, our
path reserv<ltion protocol requires only unicast on the roUling
The purpose of the HMAC with an incremenLed PID is Lo
authenticale A for BS.
During this phase. packeLs senL from lhe base slaLion to a
hosL can be droppcd hy malicious hosts trying to interrupt
the data flow. Our defense againsL these ,macks is based on
acknowledgmenLs ,md the insertion of probes [5]. Similar
Lo [5/. we use a tllfeshold on the numher of tolerable packet
losses. and define a fault to he a packet loss higher than
Lhe threshold. Inilially, ,IS seen ahove. only lhe c1ienL host A
needs to send an acknowledgment to the base slatiOIl. The
b<lse station keeps track of the number of packet losses,
as the number of ,Icknowledgmenls not received during a
certain window of packets. When the number of packets noL
acknowledged is higher than the acceptable threshold, the base
statiuo detects a faull, and initi.. tes a faulty link discovery
protocol.
The faulty link discovery protocol consists of selecting a
lIumberof inlennediate hosts on the palh from the base station
m the client host, A, ..nd requesling lhem 10 acknowledge
fuLure forwarded packets. sent by lhe base station to A. The
hosls selecled are called probes. The acknowledgment fonnat
;,
message received by BS (lincs 69-73). in messages of type
FLOW
FLOW. IdA' PID. PKT;. HMACK, (FLOW. IdA. PID. PKT;).
where PID is lhe packel idenlifier and PKT i is the iii, packelof
the flow. PKT! is part of lhe encrypted requesLed informaLioll,
thus nwintaining the confidentiality of lhe infomlation.
Each host Lhat receives a packct of type FLOW. retrieves
l'rom its local database the record corresponding to IdA, and
forwards lhe packet on lhe link 10 the next hop ,Issociated with
IdA (line 45). For each packeL receiYed. A checks the HMAC
and sends 10 BS on the reverse cellular link. an ACK packet
(lines 42-44)
ACK, IdA, HMACdACK. IdA, PID + 1. PKT1 )
ACK. Idp , HMACK,(ACK. Idp . PID -I- 1. PKT;),
8
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Fig. J. Ccllul~r ~nd ad-I"", me,'s~gc o\'~lhcad of JANUS umj lJCAN. for np 10 500 rnul>il~ b"'I~. ["'or ,'Jell r1~lwork. 20 h0515 h~,·c J fbI\' [mm Ih~ ba~~
.'I~lion. We show lh~ IOlul number of mC5s~gcs r~quir~d per 11"" rn~inlcnanrc. for Ill" 200 s~con[ls of hOSlS ItlQv~lII"nls. a\'c",gcd o"cr 10 rdmll1m inilial
network confi gur.lliolls.
verifies the <ll:curacy of the advertiseu link bandwidths using
verifiable location inform~llion (Sectiun IV-C) such nllncks can
he easily detected. In the case of tunneling. duc to Lhe use of
veril1nble position infomlation [291. the actu~1 b,mdwidth will
be detected to be O.
C. Del/ial oj Service
In this hybrid setting. the only deni,ll of service allacks
can be perfonned by hnsL~ that repe,ltedly initinte a path
reservation prOlocol, without imending to use the estahlished
path. wasting the resourl:es of the intermediate hosts.
Our defense relies on !he INIT!SGN step that each hmt
has to perform with the b,lse sUition at the beginning of
the path reservmion phase. The base station authenticates the
subsequent ADDF messages. by sending the dieTlt host a signed
message (Section IV-D), thill the dient host has to use when
contacting il~ parent with an ADDF message. The impact of
a deni<ll of service allack is localized hy our protocol to the
ad-hue neighhors of a malicious hosl. The processing of ADDF
packets still consumes resources, needed to verify the base
station's signature. ahhough, hosts can decide to ignore ADDF
packets received from repeatedly misbehaving neighbors.
D. Black Hofe
Hosts that ignore data packets afterl:orrectly [larticipating in
the path reservation protocoL generate black hules. We detect
such misbehaving hosts. with a link granularity. using O{logn)
prohes, (Section IV-E). The feedhack about malicious links is
indirectly provided by !he base station to the hosts affected hy
them. through the use of the topology tree, see Section IV-C.
Mure specifically, when the base station detects a link (u. v).
where v is the parelll of u. rcspunsihle for dropping mure
packets than advertised. it updates the link's bandwidth in
the topology tree. This is done using first a cut{u) operation
to remove the existing link. followed by a link(u. v. w) to
add a link between u <lnd v of handwidth \.1. where '01 is the
bandwidth detected dllring the prohing protocol. (Section IV-
E). Subsequently, whell calling mincost. hosts lhat use thaL
link will be able to choose a bener neighbor as [larent.
E. PalII Scrambler
Al the conclll~ion of the palh reserv<ltiun protocol, the base
station uses the idelllities of the hosts retrieved in the ADDF
packet. and Iheir keys sllilred with the base station. 10 verify
the eom:cmcss of the HMi\C received in the sallie packet. The
two v<llues du not coincide only in the case of all intenncdiate
host having t,lmpered with the ADDF message. The b,lse st,ltion
then perfonns a bina!)' search. simil<lr 10 Ihe one used for
the black hole attack. in order to retrieve a link that has a
malicious hOSI <IS an endpoim. The only difference frOI11 the
black hole coumermeasure. is that the malicious link is found
using Hl1AC verification instead of [lacket loss detection. Let
the path received hy BS be Pj .... Pk. The base statiun finds
the llIedi<ln uf the path. P(k+ll!2' and prohes it, through the
forward link. The host ]las to reply with the entire path and the
HMAC,,_l value received from its child. The base station then
chccks ffi-IAC"_l :lgainst the host"s path. The base station can
perfonn this check since it knows the identities of the hosts
on the path <lnd the keys used to compute the HMAC.
The se<lrch continues on the interval whose left endpoim
has a correct HMAC and whose right endpoint has an incorrect
value. The search ends when two consecutive hosts on the
path received by BS gh:e differellt results on the HMAC check.
If the two hosts ,Ire neighhors, the link is considered malicious.
Otherwise, the host whose HMAC does nOl check is malicious. It
is eilsy to see why this is true if the two hosts arc nut neighhors,
since each hust has to check the parem-child relation during
the path reservation phase. see Section IV-D. A. host that does
not report a message received from a host that is not its child,
must be malicious.I:or the case where the hosts are neighbors,
let the two consecutive hosts be T ,lIld U. The HMAC of T checks
and the HMAC of U does not. Let S he the host preceding T
and V the host succeeding U_ in the path received by BS. The
HMAC of S checks and tIle HHAC of V does nul. If S would
be a m,llicious host. then the HMAC of T would not check.
since S would change the p<lth that T receives. If V wuuld he
malicious and Uhonest. then the HHAC of Uwould check. since
V cannot Illilliciously change the path that reaches one of its
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fig. 5. M~,;sag~ o\"~rh",,<1 of JANUS afld UCAN. for 250 hom. wilh up 10 30 t:llflcurrem fbW5. We show lh~ 1ll1~1 flllmb~r of me5sag~,; "''l\lir~d 10 maim~ifl
~1I Ihe fbws. for Ih~ 2()() 5~Ofld5 of hOSl5 mo¥~m"fll~. ~\"er.Jged o\'er 10 fimdmn in;li~1 netv'ork confi guml;ofl.,_
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Fig:_ 6. p"rccnl~ge of Ihe oplilllum Ihmughplil ~rhk\"Cd by JANU~ ~fld
UCAN. Wh~fl Ih~ nllmbl:r of lIosls g:rows from 50 10 500 ami Ih" flumb"' of
wncurreflily 511ppol1ed IbW5 is half Ih~ flllmb~r of hosls.
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for ZOO seconds of host movements, avcraged over (he 10
inilial configuratiuns.
Figure 4(a) shows lhat the overhead of JANUS in lerms
of cellular llIess~ges grows much slower lh,m in UCAN. In
JANUS. Ihe number of cellular messages is dominated hy
lhc proaelive pari, where al each reFresh period, all Ihe hosts
COlllael the base slalion to updale lhe topolugy tree. Even
though reactive, UCAN needs to mailllain lhe paths used by
Ihe flows, that uften hreak due 10 hustmohi1ily. Every hosllhat
receives the fluuding message from a hust wilh a lower fonvanJ
link bandwidlh. cuntacls the base stalion. The overhe~d in
terms of lhe number of ad-hoc mess~ges, shown in Figure 4(b)
is higher for JANUS for networks with less than 150 hosts,
but smaller for larger nelworks. This is because in JANUS,
the numher of ad-hoc messages is dominaled by the periodic
beaconing of the parent hOSl in lhe rouling tree. On the other
hand, for dcnse nelworks, UCAN needs to contaclmany hosts
in order 10 update hroken paths (up lu ZOO llOSts per broken
palh for a nelwork of 500 hosts).
ln the second experimelll. we place Z50 hosls in Ihe same
squ<lrc. cach hosl moving ilt a maximum speed of IOntls. \Ve
incre~se lhe number of concurrent fluws from 5 10 30. For each
experiment. we choose 10 random initial configurations, each
with a differenl set of hosts concurrenlly supporting flows,
and perfoml each experimelll for ZOO seconds. Figure 5 shows
the number of cellular and ad-hoc messages required for lhe
per-flow maintenance in JANUS and UCAN. Since mOSl of
lhe Iraffic overhead of JI\NUS is generaled by lhe proactive
part of the protocol, Ihe numbcr of messages experiences
only <l small increase wilh Ihe numher of concurrent flows,
lhus lhe number of per-now messages decreases abruptly
wilh Ihe number of flows. For UCAN however, the growth
is significant, proportional to lhe number of flows, which
explains lhe <Ilmust constanl number of messages requircd for
a now. In terms of lhe cellular overhead. JANUS is constantly
more efficienl lhall UCAN. whereas in terms of lhe ad-hoc
overhc;ld. JANUS starts paying off when there are more than
15 concurrcnt flows. Ho\\'cvcr. since the main functionality of
hybrid cellular and ad-hoc nClworks consists in accessing the
cellular base stalion. it is reasonable 10 <lssume lhat lhe numbcr
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VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In tllis seclion wc compare the perfonnnllce of JANUS with
UCAN [2]. UCAN proposed the dunl interface model nnd
inlroduced ~Tl on-demamJ routing ~lgorilhm. We compare lhe
lWO ,Ilgorithms in lerms of the ccllulnr nnd nd-hoc message
overhead inlroduced, nnd of Ihe throughput gain ~chieved.
We perform the cxperimenL~ by plncing mohile hOSlS in ~
squnre of size 886 x 886m2• having lhe base stmion. wilh a
lransmission rnnge of 6oom. placed at ils center. Each hosl is
lherefore covered by the base station's lr~nsmission range. We
use lhe dependency between n host's forward link b~ndwidth
and its distnnce 10 the bnse sl<Jtion, from [Z], with the highesl
bnndwidlh value of 2.4Mbps. We use lhe mndom waypoint
mobility model [3Ij. [32], wiLhont a p~use lime, to simulale
the behavior of mubile hosts. We assume that the ad-hoc
transmission range of hosl~ is J 15m, with a link handwidlh
of llMhps at less lhan 50m distance and IMpbs <It 115m.
A. NeMork Load
We place helween 50 and 500 hosls in lhe square of size
886 x 886m2 • 20 of which have <J fluw from the base station.
For JANUS, we ,lssume a refresh r~le of O(logn), where n
is ule number of hosts, and for UCAN we fix a TTL vallie
of 3. For each network size, we choose 10 random initial
configuralions, and let the hosL~ move al a maximum speed
of IOmls for ZOO seconds. Figure 4 shows lhe tOlal numher of
cellular and ad-hoc messages required by JANUS <Jnd UCAN
10
B. Throughpul G{/ill
We measure thc lhroughpUl g<lin achic\'cd by JANUS aud
UCAN, when cumpared with lhe optimal achicvahle rale, The
oplimal achievable ratc is compUied when thc Auw of each
diem goes through lhe highesl throughpul path possible. and
we compule it off-line. In lhis experiment. lhe numbcr of hosls
grows from 50 10 500, where in each network configufiltiun
half of the hosts maintain a fluw. JANUS is nlll wilh ,1 refrcsh
mte of logn. where n is the numbcr of hosts, and DCAN
with .. TfL of 5. The hosls movc l1t a maximuJIl speed of
3m/s. For each value of n. between 50 aml SOO. we choose
10 random inilial configuralions and leI the experiment run for
200 seconds. ami plot only the aver<lge v<llucs. Figure 6 shows
lhat JANUS is able to roule the flows with a Lotal throughpUl
of around 80'70 of the optimal. The performance of UCAN
deleriorales very quickly when the number of hosls approaches
100. due 10 congestion of hOSlS lhat report a good downlink
rate (Jl the base stalion.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this raper we have presented JANUS. a secure rout-
ing algoriLhm for dual inlerf'll:e. hyhrid networks, We h<lve
described several auacks Lhat maliciullS hosts can perfonn
againsl such networks, and we have explained the defenses
provided by JANUS. We have measured experimentally Lhe
overhead incuITed and Lhroughpill achieved by JANUS alld
have shuwn that il outperforms UCAN by a large margin.
withuUl compromising lhe security of the network, While wc
have focused on hybrid nelworks consisting of a cellular ilnd a
wireless inlerface. we believe that the network model proposed
is general enough to aceommodale any network whose hosts
communicate through faSl but ephemeral links with each olher,
hilt wilh a slow <lnd reliable link Lo a central access point.
j:ulure work in lhe sallie lines concentrales on eXlending
the techniques presented here for overlay nelworks, which
demonstrate a related set of security lhreilts and they could
be modeled in a similar fashion as hybrid oetworks.
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